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Abstract—Prior work on automatic control synthesis for cyber-
physical systems under logical constraints has primarily focused
on environmental disturbances or modeling uncertainties, how-
ever, the impact of deliberate and malicious attacks has been
less studied. In this paper, we consider a discrete-time dynamical
system with a linear temporal logic (LTL) constraint in the
presence of an adversary, which is modeled as a stochastic game.
We assume that the adversary observes the control policy before
choosing an attack strategy. We investigate two problems. In
the first problem, we synthesize a robust control policy for the
stochastic game that maximizes the probability of satisfying the
LTL constraint. A value iteration based algorithm is proposed
to compute the optimal control policy. In the second problem,
we focus on a subclass of LTL constraints, which consist of
an arbitrary LTL formula and an invariant constraint. We
then investigate the problem of computing a control policy that
minimizes the expected number of invariant constraint violations
while maximizing the probability of satisfying the arbitrary
LTL constraint. We characterize the optimality condition for
the desired control policy. A policy iteration based algorithm
is proposed to compute the control policy. We illustrate the
proposed approaches using two numerical case studies.
Index Terms—Linear Temporal Logic (LTL), stochastic game,
adversary.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cyber-physical systems (CPS) are expected to perform in-
creasingly complex tasks in applications including autonomous
vehicles, teleoperated surgery, and advanced manufacturing.
An emerging approach to designing such systems is to specify
a desired behavior using formal methods, and then automat-
ically synthesize a controller satisfying the given require-
ments [1]–[5].
Temporal logics such as linear temporal logic (LTL) and
computation tree logic (CTL) are powerful tools to specify
and verify system properties [6]. In particular, LTL, whose
syntax and semantics have been well developed, is widely
used to express system properties. Typical examples include
liveness (e.g., “always eventually A”), safety (e.g., “always
not A”), and priority (e.g., “first A, then B”), as well as more
complex tasks and behaviors [6]. For systems operating in
stochastic environments or imposed probabilistic requirements
(e.g., “reach A with probability 0.9”), probabilistic extensions
have also been proposed such as safety and reachability games
that capture worst-case system behaviors [7].
In addition to modeling uncertainties and stochastic errors
[7]–[9], CPS will also be subject to malicious attacks, in-
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cluding denial-of-service and injection of false sensor mea-
surements and control inputs [10], [11]. For instance, power
outages have been reported due to the penetration of attackers
in power systems [10]. Attacks against cars and UAVs are
also reported in [11], [12]. Unlike stochastic errors/modeling
uncertainties, intelligent adversaries are able to adapt their
strategies to maximize impact against a given controller, and
thus exhibit strategic behaviors. Moreover, controllers will
have limited information regarding the objective and strategy
of the adversary, making techniques such as randomized
control strategies potentially effective in mitigating attacks.
In this case, control strategies synthesized using existing
approaches may be suboptimal in the presence of intelligent
adversaries because they are designed for CPS under errors and
uncertainties. However, automatic synthesis of control systems
in adversarial scenarios has received limited research attention.
In this paper, we investigate two problems for a probabilistic
autonomous system in the presence of an adversary who
tampers with control inputs based on the current system state.
We abstract the system as a stochastic game (SG), which is a
generalization of Markov decision process (MDP). We assume
a concurrent Stackelberg information structure, in which the
adversary and controller take actions simultaneously. Stack-
elberg games are popular models in security domain [13]–
[16]. Turn-based Stackelberg games, in which a unique player
takes action each time step, have been used to construct model
checkers [17] and compute control strategy [18], however, to
the best of our knowledge, control synthesis in the concurrent
Stackelberg setting has been less investigated.
We focus on two problems. In the first problem, we are
given an arbitrary LTL specification and focus on generating
a control strategy such that the probability of satisfying the
specification is maximized. In the second problem, we focus
on a subclass of LTL specification that combine an arbitrary
LTL specification with an invariant constraint using logical
and connectives, where an invariant constraint requires the
system to always satisfy some property. The specification of
interest is commonly required for CPS, where the arbitrary
LTL specification can be used to model properties such as
liveness and the invariant property can be used to model safety
property. We consider the scenario where the specification can-
not be satisfied. Hence, we relax the specification by allowing
violations on the invariant constraint and we select a control
policy that minimizes the average rate at which invariant
property violations occur while maximizing the probability
of satisfying the LTL specification. We make the following
specific contributions:
• We formulate an SG to model the interaction between
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2the CPS and adversary. The SG describes the system
dynamics and the effects of the joint input determined
by the controller and adversary. We propose a heuristic
algorithm to compute the SG given the system dynamics.
• We investigate how to generate a control policy that
maximizes the worst-case probability of satisfying an
arbitrary specification modeled using LTL. We prove
that this problem is equivalent to a zero-sum stochastic
Stackelberg game, in which the controller chooses a
policy to maximize the probability of reaching a desired
set of states and the adversary chooses a policy to min-
imize that probability. We give an algorithm to compute
the set of states that the system desires to reach. We
then propose an iterative algorithm for constructing an
optimal stationary policy. We prove that our approach
converges to a Stackelberg equilibrium and characterize
the convergence rate of the algorithm.
• We formulate the problem of computing a stationary
control policy that minimizes the rate at which invari-
ant constraint violations occur under the constraint that
an LTL specification must be satisfied with maximum
probability. We prove that this problem is equivalent to a
zero-sum Stackelberg game in which the controller selects
a control policy that minimizes the average violation
cost and the adversary selects a policy that maximizes
such cost. We solve the problem by building up the
connections with a generalized average cost per stage
problem. We propose a novel algorithm to generate an
optimal stationary control policy. We prove the optimality
and convergence of the proposed algorithm.
• We evaluate the proposed approach using two numerical
case studies in real world applications. We consider a
remotely controlled UAV under deception attack given
different LTL specifications. We compare the perfor-
mance of our proposed approaches with the performance
obtained using existing approaches without considering
the adversary’s presence. The results show that our pro-
posed approach outperforms existing methods.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II presents related work. Section III gives background on LTL,
SGs, and preliminary results on average cost per stage and
average cost per cycle problem. Section IV introduces the
system model. Section V presents the problem formulation
on maximizing the probability of satisfying a given LTL
specification and the corresponding solution algorithm. Section
VI presents the problem formulation and solution algorithm of
the problem of minimizing the average cost incurred due to
violating invariant property while maximizing the probability
of satisfying an LTL specification. Two numerical case studies
are presented in Section VII to demonstrate our proposed
approaches. Section VIII concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Temporal logics such as LTL and CTL are widely used
to specify and verify system properties [6], especially com-
plex system behaviors. Multiple frameworks (e.g., receding
horizon based [3], sampling based [4], sensor-based [19]–
[21], probabilistic map based [22], multi-agent based [5], and
probabilistic satisfaction based [23]) have been proposed for
motion planning in robotics under temporal logic constraints.
Control synthesis for deterministic system and probabilistic
system under LTL formulas are studied in [24] and [9],
respectively. Switching control policy synthesis among a set
of shared autonomy systems is studied in [25]. When temporal
logic constraints cannot be fulfilled [26], least-violating control
synthesis problem is studied in [27]. These existing works do
not consider the impact of malicious attacks.
Existing approaches of control synthesis under LTL con-
straints require a compact abstraction of CPS such as MDP [2],
[8], [9], which models the non-determinism and probabilistic
behaviors of the systems, and enables us applying off-the-
shelf model checking algorithms for temporal logic [6]. Robust
control of MDP under uncertainties has been extensively
studied [8], [28]. Synthesis of control and sensing strategies
under incomplete information for turn-based deterministic
game is studied in [29]. However, MDPs only model the
uncertainties that arise due to environmental disturbances and
modeling errors, and are only suitable for scenarios with a
single controller.
For CPS operating in adversarial scenarios, there are two
decision makers (the controller and adversary) and their de-
cisions are normally coupled. Thus, MDP cannot model the
system, and the robust control strategy obtained on MDP may
be suboptimal to the CPS operated in adversarial environment.
To better formulate the strategic interactions between the
controller and adversary, SG is used to generalize MDP [30].
Turn-based two-player SG, in which a unique player takes
action at each time step, have been used to construct model
checkers [17] and abstraction-refinement framework for model
checking [7], [31], [32]. Unlike the literature using turn-based
games [7], [17], [31], [32], however, we consider a different
information structure denoted as concurrent SG, in which both
players take actions simultaneously at each system state [33].
Several existing works using SGs focus on characterizing
and computing Nash equilibria [34], [35], whereas in the
present paper we consider a Stackelberg setting in which the
adversary chooses an attack strategy based on the control
policy selected by the system. The relationship between Nash
and Stackelberg equilibria is investigated in [36]. A hybrid
SG with asymmetric information structure is considered in
[18]. The problem setting in [18] is similar to turn-based
stochastic game, while the concurrent setting considered in this
paper can potentially grants advantage to the controller (see
[13] for a simple example). Moreover, the problem setting in
this paper leads to a more general class of control strategies.
Specifically, mixed strategies are considered in this work. In
particular, concurrent SGs played with mixed strategies gen-
eralizes models including Markov chains, MDPs, probabilistic
turn-based games and deterministic concurrent games [33].
The problem of maximizing the probability of satisfying a
given specification consisting of safety and liveness constraints
in the presence of adversary is considered in the preliminary
conference version of this work [37]. Whereas only a restricted
class of LTL specifications is considered in [37], in this paper,
we derive results for arbitrary LTL specifications and we also
investigate the problem of minimizing the rate of violating
3invariant constraints.
CPS security is also investigated using game and control
theoretic approaches. Secure state estimation is investigated in
[38], [39]. CPS security and privacy using game theoretic ap-
proach is surveyed in [40]. Game theory based resilient control
is considered in [41]. CPS security under Stackelberg setting
and Nash setting are studied in [14] and [42], respectively.
Stochastic Stackelberg security games have been studied in
[15], [16].
III. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we present background on LTL, stochas-
tic games, and preliminary results on the average cost per
stage (ACPS) and average cost per cycle (ACPC) problems.
Throughout this paper, we assume that inequalities between
vectors and matrices are component wise comparison.
A. Linear Temporal Logic (LTL)
An LTL formula consists of [6]
• a set of atomic propositions Π;
• Boolean operators: negation (¬), conjunction (∧) and
disjunction (∨).;
• temporal operators: next (X) and until (U).
An LTL formula is defined inductively as
φ = True | pi | ¬φ | φ1 ∧ φ2 | Xφ | φ1 U φ2.
In other words, any atomic proposition φ is an LTL formula.
Any formula formed by joining atomic propositions using
Boolean or temporal connectives is an LTL formula. Other
operators can be defined accordingly. In particular, implication
( =⇒ ) operator (φ =⇒ ψ) can be described as ¬φ∨ψ; even-
tually (3) operator 3φ can be written as 3φ = True U φ;
always (2) operator 2φ can be represented as 2φ = ¬3¬φ.
The semantics of LTL formulas are defined over infinite
words in 2Π [6]. Informally speaking, φ is true if and only if
φ is true at the current time step. ψ U φ is true if and only if
ψ ∧¬φ is true until φ becomes true at some future time step.
2φ is true if and only if φ is true for the current time step
and all the future time. 3φ is true if φ is true at some future
time. Xφ is true if and only if φ is true in the next time step.
A word η satisfying an LTL formula φ is denoted as η |= φ.
Given any LTL formula, a deterministic Rabin automaton
(DRA) can be constructed to represent the formula. A DRA
is defined as follows.
Definition 1. (Deterministic Rabin Automaton): A determinis-
tic Rabin automaton (DRA) is a tuple R = (Q,Σ, δ, q0,Acc),
where Q is a finite set of states, Σ is a finite set of
symbols called alphabet, δ : Q × Σ → Q is the
transition function, q0 is the initial state and Acc =
{(L(1),K(1)), (L(2),K(2)), · · · , (L(Z),K(Z))} is a finite
set of Rabin pairs such that L(z),K(z) ⊆ Q for all z =
1, 2, · · · , Z with Z being a positive integer.
A run ρ of a DRA over a finite input word η = η0η1 · · · ηn
is a sequence of states q0q1 · · · qn such that (qk−1, ηk, qk) ∈ δ
for all 0 ≤ k ≤ n. A run ρ is accepted if and only if there
exists a pair (L(z),K(z)) such that ρ intersects with L(z)
finitely many times and intersects with K(z) infinitely often.
Denote the satisfaction of a formula φ by a run ρ as ρ |= φ.
B. Stochastic Games
A stochastic game is defined as follows [30].
Definition 2. (Stochastic Game): A stochastic game (SG) SG
is a tuple SG = (S,UC , UA, P r, s0,Π,L), where S is a finite
set of states, UC is a finite set of actions of the controller, UA is
a finite set of actions of an adversary, Pr : S×UC×UA×S →
[0, 1] is a transition function where Pr(s, uC , uA, s′) is the
probability of a transition from state s to state s′ when the
controller’s action is uC and the adversary’s action is uA.
s0 ∈ S is the initial state. Π is a set of atomic propositions.
L : S → 2Π is a labeling function, which maps each state to
a subset of propositions that are true at each state.
Denote the set of admissible actions for the controller and
adversary at state s as UC(s) and UA(s), respectively. Given
a finite set S, we use the Kleene star S∗ and the ω symbol Sω
to denote the set obtained by concatenating elements from S
finitely and infinitely many times, respectively. Given an SG,
the set of finite paths, i.e, the set of finite sequence of states,
can be represented as S∗, while the set of infinite paths, i.e.,
the set of infinite sequence of states, can be represented as Sω .
The strategies (or policies) that players can commit to can be
classified into the following two categories.
• Pure strategy: A pure strategy gives the action of the
player as a deterministic function of the state. Suppose
the players commit to pure strategies. Then a pure control
strategy is defined as µ : S∗ → UC , which gives a specific
control action, and a pure adversary strategy is defined
as τ : S∗ → UA.
• Mixed strategy: A mixed strategy determines a probability
distribution over all admissible pure strategies. Suppose
the players commit to mixed strategy. Then a control pol-
icy for the controller is defined as µ : S∗ ×UC → [0, 1],
which maps a finite path and the admissible action to a
probability distribution over the set of actions UC(sk)
available at state sk. A policy τ for the adversary is
defined as τ : S∗ × UA → [0, 1].
In this paper we focus on computing the optimal mixed
strategy. When a specific action is assigned with probability
one, then mixed strategy reduces to pure strategy. A control
policy is stationary if it is only a function of the current
state, i.e., µ : S × UC → [0, 1] is only dependent on the last
state of the path. A stationary policy is said to be proper if
the probability of satisfying the given specification after finite
steps is positive under this policy. Given a pair of policies µ
and τ , an SG reduces to a Markov chain (MC) whose state set
is S and transition probability from state s to s′ is Pµτ (s, s′) ,∑
uC∈UC(s)
∑
uA∈UA(s) µ(s, uC)τ(s, uA)Pr(s, uC , uA, s
′).
Given a path β ∈ Sω , a word is generated as
ηβ = L(s0)L(s1) · · · . The probability of satisfying an
LTL formula φ under policies µ and τ on SG is denoted as
PrµτSG = Pr{ηβ |= φ : β ∈ Sω}.
In the following, we review a subclass of stochastic games,
denoted as Stackelberg games, involving two players [30]. In
4the Stackelberg setting, player 1 (also called leader) commits
to a strategy first. Then player 2 (also known as follower)
observes the strategy of the leader and plays its best response.
The information structure under Stackelberg setting can be
classified into the following two categories.
• Turn-based games: Exactly one player is allowed to take
action at each time step. Turn-based games are used to
model asynchronous interaction between players.
• Concurrent games: All the players take actions simulta-
neously at each time step. Concurrent games are used to
model synchronous interaction between players.
Unlike [7], [17], [31], [32], which are turn-based and played
with pure strategies, in this paper, we focus on concurrent
games with players committing to mixed strategies. To demon-
strate the efficiency of mixed strategies in a concurrent game,
we consider a robot moving to the right in a 1D space. The
action sets for the controller and adversary are {move, stay}.
If the controller and action take the same action at a given time
step, then the robot will follow the specified action, i.e., move
one step to the right under the action pair (move,move) and
stay in the current location under action pair (stay, stay). The
goal of the robot is to move to the location immediately to the
right of its starting location. When the controller commits to
a pure strategy, say move, then the adversary will always take
action stay, and the robot will remain at its starting location.
On the other hand, if the controller plays a mixed strategy,
e.g., choosing move and stay with equal probability 1/2 at
each time step, then the robot has a 1/2 probability to reach
the desired location at each time step, and hence will reach
the desired location within finite time with probability 1. On
the other hand, in a turn-based setting where the adversary
observes the controller’s action before choosing its action at
each time step, the adversary will always be able to choose
the opposite of the controller’s action and prevent the robot
from moving. Hence while mixed strategies are beneficial in
the concurrent game formulation, they are not beneficial in the
turn-based game for this case.
The concept of Stackelberg equilibrium is used to solve
Stackelberg games. The Stackelberg equilibrium is defined
formally in the following.
Definition 3. (Stackelberg Equilibrium): Denote the utility
that the leader gains in a stochastic game SG under leader
follower strategy pair (µ, τ) and the utility that the follower
gains as QL(µ, τ) and QF (µ, τ), respectively. A pair of
leader follower strategy (µ, τ) is a Stackelberg equilibrium
if leader’s strategy µ is optimal given that the follower
observes its strategy and plays its best response, i.e., µ =
argmaxµ′∈µQL(µ′,BR(µ′)), where µ is the set of all ad-
missible policies of the controller and BR(µ′) = {τ : τ =
argmaxQF (µ′, τ)} is the best response to leader’s strategy
µ′ played by the follower.
C. ACPS and ACPC Problems
We present some preliminary results on the average cost
per stage (ACPS) problem and average cost per cycle (ACPC)
problem on MDP without the presence of adversary in this
subsection. Both problems focus on deterministic control
policies µ : S → UC and unichain MDP. An MDP is said
to be unichain if for any control policy µ, the induced MC is
irreducible, i.e, the probability of reaching any state from any
state on the MC is positive. Denote the cost incurred at state
s by applying the deterministic control policy µ as g(s, µ(s)).
The transition probability from state s to s′ via action u on
MDP is denoted as Pr(s, u, s′). Each transition to a new state
is viewed as a completion of a stage. Then the objective of
ACPS problem is to minimize
Jµ(s) = lim sup
N→∞
1
N
E
{
N∑
k=0
g(sk, µ(sk))|s0 = s
}
(1)
over all deterministic stationary control policies.
It has been shown that a gain-bias pair (Jµ, hµ) for ACPS
problem satisfies the properties stated as follows.
Proposition 1 ( [43]). Assume the MDP is unichain. Then:
• the optimal ACPS J∗µ(s0) associated with each control
policy µ is independent of initial state s0, i.e., there exists
a constant J∗µ such that J
∗
µ(s0) = J
∗
µ for all s0 ∈ S;
• there exists a vector h such that J∗µ + hµ(s) =
minµ
{
g(s, µ(s)) +
∑
s′∈S Pr(s, µ(s), s
′)h(s′)
}
.
We present some preliminary results on the ACPC problem
on MDP in the following. Denote the set of states that satisfy
LTL formula φ as Sφ. A cycle is completed when Sφ is visited.
Therefore, a path starting from s0 and ending in Sφ completes
the first cycle, and the path starting from Sφ after completing
the first cycle completes the second cycle when coming back
to Sφ. Denote the number of cycles that have been completed
until stage N as C(N). The ACPC problem is described as
given an MDP and an LTL formula φ, find a control policy µ
that minimizes
Jµ(s0) = lim sup
N→∞
E
{∑N
k=0 g(sk, µ(sk))
C(N)
∣∣∣ηµ |= φ} , (2)
where ηµ = L(s0)L(s1) · · · is the word generated by the path
s0s1 · · · induced by deterministic control policy µ.
It has been shown that the following proposition holds for
the ACPC problem.
Proposition 2 ( [9]). Assume the MDP is unichain. Then:
• the optimal ACPC J∗µ(s0) associated with each control
policy µ is independent of initial state s0, i.e., there exists
a constant J∗µ such that J
∗
µ(s0) = J
∗
µ for all s0 ∈ S;
• there exists some vector h such that the following
equation holds J∗µ + h(s) = minµ
{
g(s, µ(s)) +∑
s′∈S Pr(s, µ(s), s
′)h(s′)+J∗µ
∑
s′∈S Pr(s, µ(s), s
′)
}
.
IV. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we present the system model. We consider
the following discrete-time finite state system
x(t+ 1) = f(x(t), uC(t), uA(t), ϑ(t)), ∀t = 0, 1, · · · , (3)
where x(t) is the finite system state, uC(t) is the control
input from the controller, uA(t) is the attack signal from the
adversary, and ϑ(t) is stochastic disturbance.
5In system (3), there exists a strategic adversary that can tam-
per with the system transition. In particular, the controller and
adversary jointly determine the state transition. For instance,
an adversary that launches false data injection attack modifies
the control input as u(t) = uC(t) + uA(t); an adversary that
launches denial-of-service attack manipulates the control input
as u(t) = uC(t) · uA(t), where uA(t) ∈ {0, 1}.
In security domain, Stackelberg game is widely used to
model systems in the presence of malicious attackers. In
Stackelberg setting, the controller plays as the leader and the
adversary plays as the follower. In this paper, we adopt the
concurrent Stackelberg setting. The controller first commits
to its control strategy. The adversary can stay outside for
indefinitely long time to observe the strategy of the controller
and then chooses its best response to the controller’s strategy.
However, at each time step, both players must take actions
simultaneously. The system is given some specification that is
modeled using LTL.
To abstract system (3) as a finite state/action SG, we propose
a heuristic simulation based algorithm as shown in Algorithm
1, which is generalized from the approaches proposed in [8],
[44]. The difference between Algorithm 1 and algorithms
in [8], [44] is that Algorithm 1 considers the presence of
adversary. Algorithm 1 takes the dynamical system (3), the
set of sub-regions of state space {X1, · · · , Xn} and actions as
inputs. We observe that the choice of subregions X1, . . . , Xn
may affect the accuracy of the model, however, choice of the
subregions is beyond the scope of this work. For each sub-
region Xi and pair of (control, adversary) inputs (uC , uA),
we randomly select K sample states in Xi and adversary
and control inputs that map to uC and uA. We compute
the probability distribution over the set of sub-regions {Xj}
that the system can transition to following (3), and update
Pr(Xi, uC , uA, Xj) accordingly for all Xj (Algorithm 1). To
approximate the transition probability, Monte Carlo simulation
or particle filter can be used [8], [44], [45].
In the following, we present two applications in the security
domain that can be formulated using the proposed framework.
1) Infrastructure Protection in Power System: The pro-
posed framework can capture attack-defense problems on
power system as shown in the following. An attack-defense
problem on power system is investigated in [34].
The players involved in this example are the power system
administrator and adversary. The adversary aims to disrupt the
transmission lines in power network, while the administrator
deploys resources to protect critical infrastructures or repair
damaged infrastructures. The dynamics of power system is
modeled as x(t + 1) = f(x(t), uC(t), uA(t)), where x(t)
is the state vector, uC(t) and uA(t) are the inputs from
the administrator and adversary, respectively. Depending on
the focus of the administrator, the state may contain bus
voltages, bus power injections, network frequency, and so
on. The actions of the administrator UC and adversary UA,
respectively, are the actions to protect (by deploying protection
or repair resources) and damage (by opening the breakers
at ends of) the transmission lines. If an attack is successful,
then the transmission line is out of service, which will result
Algorithm 1 Algorithm for constructing a stochastic game
approximation of a system.
1: procedure CREATE STOCHASTIC GAME( X1, . . . , Xn)
2: Input: Dynamics (3), set of subsets X1, . . . , Xn
3: Output: Stochastic game SG =
(S,UC , UA, P r, s0,Π,L)
4: Initialize K
5: S = {X1, . . . , Xn} and L is determined accordingly
6: Generate control primitive sets UC =
{uC1 , uC2 · · · , uCΞ} and UA = {uA1 , uA2 · · · , uAΓ}
7: for i = 1, . . . , n do
8: for all uC ∈ UC and uA ∈ UA do
9: for k = 1, . . . ,K do
10: x← sampled state in Xi
11: uˆC , uˆA ← sampled inputs from uC , uA
12: j ← region containing f(x, uˆC , uˆA, ϑ)
13: Invoke particle filter to approximate transi-
tion probabilities Pr between sub-region i and j for all i
and j.
14: end for
15: end for
16: end for
17: end procedure
in dramatic change on state vector. Thus the states evolve
following the joint actions of administrator and adversary.
Moreover, the probability of the occurrence of events, i.e.,
the transmission line is out of service, is jointly determined
by the actions of adversary and administrator (or defender).
The specifications that can be given to the system might in-
clude reachability (e.g., ’eventually satisfy optimal power flow
equation’: 3OPF ) and reactivity (e.g., ’if voltage exceeds
some threshold, request load shedding from demand side’:
2(voltage alarm =⇒ X DR)).
2) Networked Control System under Attacks: In the follow-
ing, we present an example on control synthesis for networked
control system under deception attacks.
The system is modeled as a discrete linear time invariant
system x(k + 1) = Ax(k) + Bu(k) + ϑ(k), k = 0, 1 · · · ,
where x(k) is the system state, u(k) is the compromised
control input and ϑ(k) is independent Gaussian distributed
disturbance. There exists an intelligent and strategic adver-
sary that can compromise the control input of the system
by launching deception attack. When the adversary launches
deception attack on system actuator [14], then the control input
is represented as u(k) = uC(k)+uA(k). Typical specifications
that are assigned to the system include stability and safety
(e.g., ‘eventually reach stable status while not reaching unsafe
state’: 32stable ∧2¬unsafe).
V. PROBLEM FORMULATION - MAXIMIZING
SATISFACTION PROBABILITY
In this section, we formulate the problem of maximizing
the probability of satisfying a given LTL specification in
the presence of an adversary. We first present the problem
formulation, and then give a solution algorithm for computing
the optimal control policy.
6A. Problem Statement
The problem formulation is as follows.
Problem 1. Given a stochastic game SG and an LTL specifi-
cation φ, compute a control policy µ that maximizes the prob-
ability of satisfying the specification φ under any adversary
policy τ , i.e.,
max
µ
min
τ
PrµτSG(φ). (4)
Denote the probability of satisfying specification φ as satis-
faction probability. The policies µ and τ that achieve the max-
min value of (4) can be interpreted as an equilibrium defined
in Definition 3 in a zero-sum Stackelberg game between the
controller and adversary, in which the controller first chooses
a randomized policy µ, and the adversary observes µ and
selects a policy τ to minimize PrµτSG(φ|s). By Von Neumann’s
theorem [46], the satisfaction probability at equilibrium must
exist. We restrict our attention to the class of stationary
policies, leaving the general case for future work. We have
the following preliminary lemma.
Lemma 1. Let satisfaction probability v(s) =
maxµ minτ Pr
µτ
SG(φ|s). Then
v(s) = max
µ
min
τ
∑
uC∈UC(s)
∑
uA∈UA(s)
∑
s′∈S
µ(s, uC)
τ(s, uA)v(s
′)Pr(s, uC , uA, s′). (5)
Conversely, if v(s) satisfies (5), then v(s) =
maxµ minτ Pr
µτ
SG(φ|s). Moreover, the satisfaction probability
v is unique.
Proof. In the following, we will first show the forward direc-
tion. We let n = |S| and define three operators Tµτ : [0, 1]n →
[0, 1]n, Tµ : [0, 1]n → [0, 1]n, and T : [0, 1]n → [0, 1]n.
(Tµτv)(s) =
∑
s′
Pr(s, µ, τ, s′)v(s′)
(Tµv)(s) = min
τ
∑
s′
Pr(s, µ, τ, s′)v(s′)
(Tv)(s) = max
µ
min
τ
∑
s′
Pr(s, µ, τ, s′)v(s′)
where Pr(s, µ, τ, s′) =
∑
uC∈UC(s)
∑
uA∈UA(s) µ(s, uC)
τ(s, uA)Pr(s, uC , uA, s
′). Suppose that µ is a Stackelberg
equilibrium with v(s) equal to the satisfaction probability for
state s, and yet (5) does not hold. We have that v = Tµv, since
v is the optimal policy for the MDP defined by the policy
µ [43]. On the other hand, Tµv ≤ Tv. Composing T and
Tµ k times and taking the limit as k tends to infinity yields
v = limk→∞ T kµv ≤ limk→∞ T kv , v∗. The convergence
of T kv to a fixed point v∗ follows from the fact that T is a
bounded and monotone nondecreasing operator. Furthermore,
choosing the policy µ(s) at each state as the maximizer of
(5) yields a policy with satisfaction probability v∗. Hence
v ≤ v∗. If v(s) = v∗(s) for all states s, then (5) is satisfied,
contradicting the assumption that the equation does not hold.
On the other hand, if v(s) < v∗(s) for some state s, then µ
is not a Stackelberg equilibrium.
We next show that the vector v satisfying (5) is unique.
Since every Stackelberg equilibrium satisfies (5), if the vector
v is unique, then the vector v must be a Stackelberg equilib-
rium. Suppose that uniqueness does not hold, and let µ and µ′
be Stackelberg equilibrium policies with corresponding satis-
faction probabilities v and v′. We have that v = Tv ≥ Tµ′v.
Composing k times and taking the limit as k tends to infinity,
we have v = limk→∞ T kv ≥ limk→∞ T kµ′v = v′. By the same
argument, v′ ≥ v, implying that v = v′ and thus uniqueness
holds.
By Lemma 1, we have that the satisfaction probability for
some state s can be computed as the linear combination of
the satisfaction probabilities of its neighbor states, where the
coefficients are the transition probabilities jointly determined
by the control and adversary policies. Lemma 1 provides
us the potential to apply iterative algorithm to compute the
satisfaction probability.
B. Computing the Optimal Policy
Motivated by model checking algorithms [6], we first con-
struct a product SG. Then we analyze Problem 1 on the
product SG. A product SG is defined as follows.
Definition 4. (Product SG): Given an SG SG =
(S,UC , UA, P r,L,Π) and a DRA R = (Q,Σ, δ, q0,Acc), a
(labeled) product SG is a tuple G = (SG , UC , UA, P rG ,AccG),
where SG = S × Q is a finite set of states, UC is a
finite set of control inputs, UA is a finite set of attack
signals, PrG((s, q), uC , uA, (s′, q′)) = Pr(s, uC , uA, s′)
if δ(q,L(s′)) = q′, AccG = {(LG(1),KG(1)),
(LG(2),KG(2)), · · · , (LG(Z),KG(Z))} is a finite set
of Rabin pairs such that LG(z),KG(z) ⊆ SG for all
z = 1, 2, · · · , Z with Z being a positive integer. In particular,
a state (s, q) ∈ LG(z) if and only if q ∈ L(z), and a state
(s, q) ∈ KG(z) if and only if q ∈ K(z).
By Definition 2 and Definition 4, we have the following
observations. First, since the transition probability is deter-
mined by SG and the satisfaction condition is determined by
R, the satisfaction probability of φ on SG is equal to the
satisfaction probability of φ on the product SG G. Second,
we can generate the corresponding path s0s1 · · · on SG
given a path (s0, q0)(s1, q1) · · · on the product SG G. Finally,
given a control policy µ synthesized on the product SG G, a
corresponding control policy µSG on SG is obtained by letting
µSG(si) = µ((si, q)) for all time step i [6], [8]. Due to these
one-to-one correspondence relationships, in the following, we
analyze Problem 1 on the product SG G and present an
algorithm to compute the optimal control policy. When the
context is clear, we use s to represent state (s, q) ∈ SG .
We next introduce the concept of Generalized Accepting
Maximal End Component (GAMEC), which is generalized
from accepting maximal end component (AMEC) on MDP.
Definition 5. (Sub-SG): A sub-SG of an SG SG =
(S,UC , UA, P r, s0,Π,L) is a pair of states and actions
(C,D) where ∅ 6= C ⊆ S is a set of states, and D : C →
2UC(s) is an enabling function such that D(s) ⊆ UC(s) for
7all s ∈ C and {s′|Pr(s, uC , uA, s′) > 0,∀uA ∈ UA(s), s ∈
C} ⊆ C.
By Definition 5, we have a sub-SG is also an SG. Given
Definition 5, a Generalized Maximal End Component (GMEC)
is defined as follows.
Definition 6. A Generalized End Component (GEC) is a sub-
SG (C,D) such that the underlying digraph G(C,D) of sub-
SG (C,D) is strongly connected. A GMEC is a GEC (C,D)
such that there exists no other GEC (C ′, D′) 6= (C,D), where
C ⊆ C ′ and D(s) ⊆ D′(s) for all s ∈ C.
Definition 7. A GAMEC on the product SG G is a GMEC if
there exists some (LG(z),KG(z)) ∈ AccG such that LG(z) ∩
C = ∅ and KG(z) ⊆ C.
By Definition 7, we have a set of states constitutes a
GAMEC if there exists a control policy such that for any initial
states in the GAMEC, the system remains in the GAMEC
with probability one and the specification is satisfied with
probability one. We denote the set of GAMECs as C, and
the set of states that constitute GAMEC as accepting states.
Algorithm 2 is used to compute the set of GAMECs. Given a
product SG G, a set of GAMECs C can be initialized as C = ∅
and D(s) = UC(s) for all s. Also, we define a temporary set
Ctemp which is initialized as Ctemp = SG . Then from line 8 to
line 17, we compute a set of states R that should be removed
from GMEC. The set R is first initialized to be empty. Then for
each state s in each nontrivial strongly connected component
(SCC) of the underlying diagraph, i.e., the SCC with more
than one states, we modify the admissible actions at state s
by keeping the actions that can make the system remain in C
under any adversary action. If there exists no such admissible
action at state s, then the state s is added into R. From line 18
to line 26, we examine if there exists any state s′ in current
GMEC that will steer the system into states in R. In particular,
by taking action uC at each state s′, if there exists some
adversary action uA such that the system is steered into some
state s ∈ R, then uC is removed from UC(s′). Moreover, if
there exists no admissible action at state s′, then s′ is added
to R. Then we update the GMEC set as shown from line 27
to line 32. This procedure is repeated until no further update
can be made on GMEC set. Line 34 to line 40 is to find the
GAMEC following Definition 7. Given the set of GAMECs
C = {(C1, D1), · · · , (Ch, Dh), · · · , (C|C|, D|C|)} returned by
Algorithm 2, the set of accepting states E is computed as
E = ∪|C|h=1Ch.
The main idea to computing the solution to (4) is to show
that the max-min probability of (4) is equivalent to maximizing
(over µ) the worst-case probability of reaching the set of
accepting states E . Denote the probability of reaching the set of
accepting states E as reachability probability. In the following,
we formally prove the equivalence between the worst-case
satisfaction probability of (4) and the worst-case reachability
probability. Then, we present an efficient algorithm for com-
puting a policy µ that maximizes the worst-case probability of
reaching E , with the proofs of the correctness and convergence
of the proposed algorithm. In particular, our proposed solution
is based on the following.
Algorithm 2 Computing the set of GAMECs C.
1: procedure COMPUTE GAMEC(G)
2: Input: Product SG G
3: Output: Set of GAMECs C
4: Initialization: Let D(s) = UC(s) for all s ∈ SG . Let C = ∅
and Ctemp = {SG}
5: repeat
6: C = Ctemp, Ctemp = ∅
7: for C ∈ C do
8: R = ∅ . R is the set of states that should be
removed
9: Let SCC1, · · · , SCCn be the set of nontrivial
strongly connected components (SCC) of the underlying diagraph
G(C,D)
10: for i = 1, · · · , n do
11: for each state s ∈ SCCi do
12: D(s) = {uC ∈ UC(s)|s′ ∈
C where Pr(s, uC , uA, s′) > 0, ∀uA ∈ UA(s)}
13: if D(s) = ∅ then
14: R = R ∪ {s}
15: end if
16: end for
17: end for
18: while R 6= ∅ do
19: dequeue s ∈ R from R and C
20: if there exist s′ ∈ C and uC ∈ UC(s′) such that
Pr(s′, uC , uA, s) > 0 under some uA ∈ UA(s′) then
21: D(s′) = D(s′) \ {uC}
22: if D(s′) = ∅ then
23: R = R ∪ {s′}
24: end if
25: end if
26: end while
27: for i = 1, · · · , n do
28: if C ∩ SCCi 6= ∅ then
29: C = Ctemp ∪ {C ∩ SCCi}
30: end if
31: end for
32: end for
33: until C = Ctemp
34: for C ∈ C do
35: for (LG(z),KG(z)) ∈ AccG do
36: if LG(z) ∩ C 6= ∅ or KG(z) 6⊆ C then
37: C = C \ C
38: end if
39: end for
40: end for
41: return C
42: end procedure
Proposition 3. For any stationary control policy µ and initial
state s, the minimum probability over all stationary adversary
policies of satisfying the LTL formula is equal to the minimum
probability over all stationary policies of reaching E , i.e.,
given any stationary policy µ, we have
min
τ
PrµτG (φ|s) = minτ Pr
µτ
G (reach E|s), (6)
where PrµτG (reach E) is the probability of reaching E under
policies µ and τ .
Proof. By Definition of E , if the system reaches E ,
then φ is satisfied for a maximizing policy µ. Thus
minτ Pr
µτ
G (reach E) = minτ PrµτG (φ).
Suppose that for some control policy µ and initial state s0,
min
τ
PrµτG (φ|s0) > minτ Pr
µτ
G (reach E|s0), (7)
8and let τ be a minimizing stationary policy for the adversary.
The policies µ and τ induce an MC on the state space. By
model checking algorithms on MC [6], the probability of
satisfying φ from s0 is equal to the probability of reaching
a bottom strongly connected component (BSCC) that satisfies
φ. By assumption there exists a BSCC, denoted SCC0,
that is reachable from s0, disjoint from E , and yet satisfies
PrµτG (φ|s) = 1 for all s ∈ S0 (if this were not the case, then
(7) would not hold).
Choose a state s ∈ SCC0. Since s /∈ E , there exists a policy
τˆ such that PrµτˆP (φ|s) < 1. Create a new adversary policy τ1
as τ1(s′) = τˆ(s′) for all s′ ∈ SCC0 and τ1(s′) = τ(s′)
otherwise. This policy induces a new MC on the state space.
Furthermore, since only the outgoing transitions from SCC0
are affected, the success probabilities of all sample paths that
do not reach SCC0 are unchanged.
If there exists any state s′ that is reachable from s in the
new chain with Prµτ1G (φ|s′) < 1, then the policy τ1 strictly
reduces the probability of satisfying φ, thus contradicting the
assumption that τ is a minimizing policy. Otherwise, let SCC1
denote the set of states that are reachable from s under µ
and τ1 and are disjoint from E (this set must be non-empty;
otherwise, the policy τˆ would lead to PrµτˆG (φ|s) = 1, a
contradiction). Construct a new policy τ2 by τ2(s′) = τˆ(s′)
if s′ ∈ S1 and τ2(s′) = τ(s′) otherwise. Proceeding in-
ductively, we derive a sequence of policies τk that satisfy
PrµτkG (φ) ≤ PrµτG (φ). This process terminates when either
PrµτkG (φ|s0) < PrµτG (φ|s0), contradicting the minimality of
τ , or when PrµτkG (φ|s′′) = PrµτˆG (φ|s′′) for all s′′ that are
reachable from s under τˆ . The latter case, however, implies
that PrµτˆG (φ|s)) = 1, contradicting the definition of τˆ .
Proposition 3 implies that the problem of maximizing the
worst-case success probability can be mapped to a reachability
problem on the product SG G, where G is modified following
Algorithm 3. A dummy state dest is added into the state space
of SG . All transitions starting from a state in GAMECs are
directed to state dest with probability one regardless of the
actions taken by the adversary. The transition probabilities
and action spaces of all other nodes are unchanged. We
observe that the reachability probability remains unchanged
after applying Algorithm 3. Hence the satisfaction probability
remains unchanged. Moreover, the one-to-one correspondence
of control policy still holds for states outside E . Therefore,
Problem 1 is then equivalent to
max
µ
min
τ
PrµτG (reach dest) (8)
Then, the solution to (4) can be obtained from the solution to
(8) by following the optimal policy µ∗ for (8) at all states not
in E . The control policy for states in E can be any probability
distribution over the set of enabled actions in each GAMEC.
Due to Proposition 3, in the following we focus on solv-
ing the problem (8). Our approach for solving (8) is to
first compute a value vector v ∈ R|SG |, where v(s) =
maxµ minτ Pr
µτ
G (reach dest|s). By Lemma 1, the optimal
policy can then be obtained from v by choosing the distribution
µ that solves the optimization problem of (5) at each state
Algorithm 3 Modifying product SG G.
1: procedure CONSTRUCT SG(G, C)
2: Input: Product SG G, the set of GAMECs C
3: Output: Modified product SG G
4: SG := SG ∪ {dest},UC(s) := UC(s) ∪ {d}, ∀s ∈ SG
5: PrG(s, d, uA, dest) = 1 for all s ∈ E ∪ {dest} and
uA ∈ UA(s)
6: end procedure
s. Algorithm 4 gives a value iteration based algorithm for
computing v. The idea of the algorithm is to initialize v to
be zero except on states in E , and then greedily update v(s)
at each iteration by computing the optimal Stackelberg policy
at each state. The algorithm terminates when a stationary v is
reached.
Algorithm 4 Algorithm for a control strategy that maximizes
the probability of satisfying φ.
1: procedure MAX REACHABILITY(G, C)
2: Input: product SG G, the set of GAMECs C
3: Output: Vector v ∈ R|SG |, where v(s) =
max minPrµτG (reach dest|s0 = s)
4: Initialization: v0 ← 0, v1(s)← 1 for s ∈ E , v1(s)←
0 otherwise, k ← 0
5: while max {|vk+1(s)− vk(s)| : s ∈ SG} > δ do
6: k ← k + 1
7: for s /∈ E do
8: Compute v as vk+1(s) ← maxµ minτ{∑
s′
∑
uC∈UC(s)
∑
uA∈UA(s) v(s
′)µ(s, uC)τ(s, uA)
PrG(s, uC , uA, s′)
}
9: end for
10: end while
11: return v
12: end procedure
The following theorem shows that Algorithm 4 guarantees
convergence to a Stackelberg equilibrium.
Theorem 1. There exists v∞ such that for any  > 0, there
exists δ and K such that ||vk − v∞||∞ <  for k > K.
Furthermore, v∞ satisfies the conditions of v in Lemma 1.
Proof. We first show that, for each s, the sequence vk(s) : k =
1, 2, . . . , is bounded and monotone. Boundedness follows from
the fact that, at each iteration, vk(s) is a convex combination of
the states of its neighbors, which are bounded above by 1. To
show monotonicity, we induct on k. Note that v1(s) ≥ v0(s)
and v2(s) ≥ v1(s) since v1(s) = 0 for s /∈ E and vk(s) ≡ 1
for s ∈ E .
Let µk denote the optimal control policy at step k. We have
vk+1(s) ≥ min
τ
∑
uC∈UC(s)
∑
uA∈UA(s)
∑
s′∈S
vk(s′) (9)
·µk(s, uC)τ(s, uA)PrG(s, uC , uA, s′)
≥ min
τ
∑
uC∈UC(s)
∑
uA∈UA(s)
∑
s′∈S
vk−1(s′) (10)
9·µk(s, uC)τ(s, uA)PrG(s, uC , uA, s′)
= vk(s) (11)
Eq. (9) follows because the value of vk+1(s), which corre-
sponds to the maximizing policy, dominates the value achieved
by the particular policy µks . Eq. (9) holds by induction,
since vk(s′) ≥ vk−1(s′) for all s′. Finally, (11) holds by
construction of µks . Hence v
k(s) is monotone in k.
We therefore have that vk(s) is a bounded monotone
sequence, and hence converges by the monotone convergence
theorem. Let v∞ denote the vector of limit points, so that
we can select δ sufficiently small (to prevent the algorithm
from terminating before convergence) and K large in order to
satisfy ||vk − v∞||∞ < .
We now show that v∞ is a Stackelberg equilibrium. Since
vk(s) converges, it is a Cauchy sequence and thus for any
 > 0, there exists K such that k > K implies that |vk(s)−
vk+1(s)| < . By construction, this is equivalent to∣∣∣vk(s)−max
µ
min
τ
∑
uC∈UC(s)
∑
uA∈UA(s)
∑
s′∈S
[
vk−1(s′)µ(s, uC)
τ(s, uA)PrG(s, uC , uA, s′)
]∣∣∣ < ,
and hence v∞ is within  of a Stackelberg equilibrium for
every  > 0.
While this approach guarantees asymptotic convergence to
a Stackelberg equilibrium, there is no guarantee on the rate
of convergence. By modifying Line 8 of the algorithm so that
vk+1(s) is updated if
max
µ
min
τ
∑
uC∈UC(s)
∑
uA∈UA(s)
∑
s′∈S
[
v(s′)µ(s, uC)τ(s, uA)
Pr(s, uC , uA, s
′)
]
> (1 + )vk(s) (12)
and is constant otherwise, we derive the following result on
the termination time.
Proposition 4. The -relaxation of (12) converges to a value
of v satisfying max{|vk+1(s) − vk(s)| : s ∈ SG} <  within
nmaxs
{
log
(
1
v0(s)
)
/log (1 + )
}
iterations, where v0(s) is
the smallest positive value of vk(s) for k = 0, 1, . . ..
Proof. After N updates, we have that vN (s) ≥ (1 +
)Nv0(s). Hence for each s, v(s) will be incremented at
most maxs
{
log
(
1
v0(s)
)
/log (1 + )
}
times. Furthermore, we
have that at least one v(s) must be updated at each iteration,
thus giving the desired upper bound on the number of itera-
tions. By definition of (12), the set that is returned satisfies
|vk+1(s)− vk(s)| < vk(s) < .
VI. PROBLEM FORMULATION-MINIMIZING INVARIANT
CONSTRAINT VIOLATION
In this section, we focus on a subclass of specifications of
the form φ = φ1∧ψ, where φ1 is an arbitrary LTL formula and
ψ is an invariant constraint. An invariant constraint requires
the system to always satisfy some property. The general LTL
formula φ1 can be used to model any arbitrary properties
such as liveness φ1 = 23pi, while the invariant property
can be used to model collision avoidance requirements ψ =
2¬obstacle. Given an LTL specification on the dynamical
system (3), it might be impossible for the system to satisfy
the specification due to the presence of the adversary, i.e.,
maxµ minτ Pr
µτ
SG(φ) = 0. Thus, we relax the specification
by allowing violations on invariant constraint ψ. To minimize
the impact of invariant constraint violations, we investigate the
problem of minimizing the invariant constraint violation rate
in this section. In particular, given a specification φ = φ1∧ψ,
the objective is to compute a control policy that minimizes
the expected number of violations of ψ per cycle over all the
stationary policies that maximizes the probability of satisfying
φ1. We say that every visit to a state that satisfies φ1 completes
a cycle. We still focus on the SG generated from (3).
In the following, we first formulate the problem. Motivated
by the solution idea of ACPC problem, we solve the problem
by generalizing the ACPS problem in [43] and establishing
a connection between the problem we formulated and the
generalized ACPS problem. Finally, we present the optimality
conditions of the problem of interest, and propose an efficient
algorithm to solve the problem.
A. Problem Statement
In the following, we focus on how to generate a control
policy that minimizes the rate at which ψ is violated while
guaranteeing that the probability of satisfying φ1 is maxi-
mized. The problem is stated as follows:
Problem 2. Compute a secure control policy µ that minimizes
the violation rate of ψ, i.e., the expected number of violations
of ψ per cycle, while maximizing the probability that φ1 is
satisfied under any adversary policy τ .
To investigate the problem above, we assign a positive cost
α to every transition initiated from a state s if s 6|= ψ. If state
s |= ψ, we let g(s) = 0 for all uC and uA. Thus we have for
all uC and uA
g(s) =
{
α if s 6|= ψ
0 if s |= ψ. (13)
By Proposition 3, we have that two consecutive visits to E
complete a cycle. Based on the transition cost defined in (13),
Problem 2 can be rewritten as follows.
Problem 3. Given a stochastic game SG and an LTL formula
φ in the form of φ = φ1 ∧ ψ, obtain an optimal control
policy µ that maximizes the probability of satisfying φ1 while
minimizing the average cost per cycle due to violating ψ which
is defined as
JµτSG = lim sup
N→∞
E
{∑N
k=0 g(sk)
I(β,N)
∣∣∣ ηβ |= φ1}. (14)
Since φ1 is required to be satisfied, similar to our analysis in
Section V, we first construct a product SG G using SG SG and
the DRA converted from specification φ1. Then we have the
following observations. First, the one-to-one correspondence
relationships between the control policies, paths, and associ-
ated expected cost due to violating ψ on SG and G hold.
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Furthermore, we observe that if there exists a control policy
such that the specification φ can be satisfied, it is the optimal
solution to Problem 3 with JµτSG = 0. Finally, by our analysis in
Section V, specification φ1 is guaranteed to be satisfied if there
exists a control policy that can reach the set of accepting states
E . These observations provide us the advantage to analyze
Problem 3 on the product SG G constructed using SG SG
and DRA constructed using φ1. Hence, in the following, we
analyze Problem 3 on the product SG G. When the context
is clear, we use s to refer to state (s, q) ∈ SG . Without loss
of generality, we assume that E = {1, 2, · · · , l}, i.e., states
{l + 1, · · · , n} ∩ E = ∅.
B. Computing the Optimal Control Policy
Due to the presence of an adversary, the results presented
in Proposition 1 are not applicable. In the following we first
generalize the ACPS problem discussed in [43], which focused
on systems without adversaries. Then we characterize the
optimality conditions for Problem 3 by connecting it with the
generalized ACPS problem.
Generalized ACPS problem. The presence of adversary is
not considered in the ACPS problem considered in [43]. Thus
we need to formulate the ACPS problem with the presence of
adversary and we denote it as the generalized ACPS problem.
The objective of generalized ACPS problem is to minimize
Jµτ (s) = lim sup
N→∞
1
N
E
{
N∑
n=0
g(s) | s0 = s
}
(15)
over all stationary control considering the adverary plays some
strategy τ against the controller.
Optimality conditions for generalized ACPS problem.
Given any stationary policies µ and τ , denote the induced
transition probability matrix as Pµτ with Pµτ (s, s′) =∑
uC∈UC(s)
∑
uA∈UA(s) µ(s, uC)τ(s, uA)PrG(s, uC , uA, s
′).
Analogously, denote the expected transition cost
starting from any state s ∈ SG as gµτ (s) =∑
uC∈UC(s)
∑
uA∈UA(s) µ(s, uC)τ(s, uA)g(s). Similar to
[43], a gain-bias pair is used to characterize the optimality
condition. The gain-bias pair (Bµτ , bµτ ) under stationary
policies µ and τ , where Bµτ is the average cost per stage
and bµτ is the differential or relative cost vector, satisfies the
following proposition.
Lemma 2. Let µ and τ be proper stationary policies for
a communicating SG, where a communicating SG is an SG
whose underlying graph is strongly connected. Then there
exists a constant ζµτ such that
Bµτ (s) = ζµτ , ∀s ∈ SG . (16)
Furthermore, the gain-bias pair (Bµτ , bµτ ) satisfies
Bµτ (s) + bµτ (s) = gµτ (s) +
n∑
k=1
Pµτ (s, k)bµτ (k) (17)
Proof. Suppose s′ is a recurrent state under policies µ and τ .
Define ξ(s) as the expected cost to reach s′ for the first time
from state s, and o(s) as the expected number of stages to
reach s′ for the first time from s. Thus ξ(s′) and o(s′) can
be interpretated as the expected cost and expected number
of stages to return to s′ for the first time from state s′,
respectively. Based on the definitions above, we have the
following equations:
ξ(s) = gµτ (s) +
∑
k∈S\s′
Pµτ (s, k)ξ(k), ∀s ∈ SG , (18)
o(s) = 1 +
∑
k∈SG\s′
Pµτ (s, k)o(k), ∀s ∈ SG . (19)
Define ζµτ = ξ(s′)/o(s′). Multiplying (19) by ζµτ and
subtracting the associated product from (18), we have
ξ(s)− ζµτo(s) = gµτ (s)− ζµτ
+
∑
k∈SG\s′
Pµτ (s, k)(ξ(k)− ζµτo(k)), ∀s ∈ SG . (20)
Define a bias term
bµτ (s) = ξ(s)− ζµτo(s), ∀s ∈ SG (21)
Using (21), (20) can be rewritten as
ζµτ+bµτ (s) = gµτ (s)+
n∑
k=1
Pµτ (s, k)bµτ (k), ∀s ∈ SG (22)
which completes our proof.
The result presented above generalizes the one in [43] in the
sense that we consider the presence of adversary. The reason
that we focus on communicating SG is that we will focus on
the accepting states which are strongly connected. Based on
Lemma 2, we have the optimality conditions for generalized
ACPS problem expressed using the gain-bias pair (B, b):
B(s) = min
µ
max
τ
∑
uC∈UC(s)
∑
uA∈UA(s)
∑
s′
µ(s, uC)τ(s, uA)
· PrG(s, uC , uA, s′)B(s′) (23)
B(s) + b(s) = min
µ∈µ∗maxτ∈τ∗
[
gµτ (s) +
∑
uC∈UC(s)
∑
uA∈UA(s)
∑
s′
µ(s, uC)τ(s, uA)PrG(s, uC , uA, s′)b(s′)
]
(24)
where µ∗ and τ∗ are the optimal policy sets obtained by solv-
ing (23). Eq. (23) can be shown using the method presented
in Lemma 1, and (24) is obtained directly from (22). Given
the optimality conditions (23) and (24) for generalized ACPS
problem, we can derive the optimality conditions for Problem
3 by mapping Problem 3 to generalized ACPS problem.
Optimality conditions for Problem 3. In the following,
we establish the connection between the generalized ACPS
problem and Problem 3. Given the connection, we then derive
the optimality conditions for Problem 3.
Denote the gain-bias pair of Problem 3 on the prod-
uct SG G as (JG , hG), where JG , hG ∈ Rn. Denote
the gain-bias pair under policies µ and τ as (JµτG , h
µτ
G ),
where JµτG = [J
µτ
G (1), J
µτ
G (2), · · · , JµτG (n)]T and hµτG =
[hµτG (1), h
µτ
G (2), · · · , hµτG (n)]T .
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We can express the transition probability matrix Pµτ in-
duced by control and adversary policy µ and τ as Pµτ =
Pµτin + P
µτ
out , where
Pµτin (s, s
′) =
{
Pµτ (s, s′) if s′ ∈ E
0 otherwise
(25a)
Pµτout (s, s
′) =
{
Pµτ (s, s′) if s′ /∈ E
0 otherwise
. (25b)
Denote the probability that we visit some accepting state
s′ ∈ E from state s under policies µ and τ as Pˆµτ (s, s′).
Then we see that Pˆµτ (s, s′) is calculated as
Pˆµτ (s, s′) =
∑
uC∈UC(s)
µ(s, uC)
∑
uA∈UA(s)
τ(s, uA)
PrG(s, uC , uA, s′) +
∑
uC∈UC(s)
µ(s, uC)
∑
uA∈UA(s)
τ(s, uA)
n∑
k=l+1
PrG(s, uC , uA, k)Pˆµτ (k, s′). (26)
The intuition behind (26) is that the probability that s′ is the
first state to be visited consists of the following two parts. The
first term in (26) describes the probability that next state is in
E . The second term in (26) models the probability that before
reaching state s′ ∈ E , the next visiting state is k /∈ E . Denote
the transition probability matrix formed by Pˆ (s, s′) as Pˆµτ .
Since Pµτout is substochastic and transient, we have I −Pµτout is
non-singular [47], where I is the identity matrix with proper
dimension. Thus I − Pµτout is invertible. Then using (25), the
transition probability matrix Pˆµτ is represented as
Pˆµτ = (I − Pµτout )−1Pµτin . (27)
Denote the expected invariant property violation cost in-
curred when visiting some accepting state s′ ∈ E from state
s under policies µ and τ as gˆ(s). The expected cost gˆ(s) is
calculated as follows:
gˆ(s) = gµτ (s) +
n∑
k=l+1
Prµτ (s, k)gˆ(k). (28)
Under policies µ and τ , denote the expected cost vector formed
by gˆ(s) as gˆµτ . Then using (25), the expected cost vector (28)
can be rearranged as follows:
gˆµτ = Pµτout gˆ
µτ + gµτ ⇒ gˆµτ = (I − Pµτout )−1gµτ . (29)
Using (27) and (29), we can rewrite (14) as
JµτG = lim sup
N→∞
1
N
N−1∑
k=0
Pˆµτ
k
gˆµτ . (30)
Proper policies µ and τ of the product SG G for Problem
3 are related to proper policies µˆ and τˆ for generalized ACPS
problem as follows:
Pˆµτ = P µˆτˆ , gˆµτ = gµˆτˆ , JµτG = B
µˆτˆ . (31)
If we define a bias term hµτG = b
µˆτˆ , then a gain-bias pair
(JµτG , h
µτ
G ) is constructed for Problem 3. Under the worst case
adversary policy τˆ , the control policy that makes the gain-bias
pair of ACPS problem satisfy
B + b ≤ gµˆτˆ + P µˆτˆ b (32)
is optimal. That is, the control policy µ∗ that maps to µˆ∗ is
optimal.
To obtain the optimal control policy, we need to characterize
Problem 3 in terms of the control and adversary policies µ and
τ . The following lemma generalizes the results presented in
[9] in which no adversary is considered. For completeness, we
show its proof which generalizes the proof in [9].
Lemma 3. The gain-bias pair (JµτG , h
µτ
G ) of Problem 3 under
policies µ and τ satisfies the following equations:
JµτG = P
µτJµτG , (33)
JµτG + h
µτ
G = g
µτ + PµτhµτG + P
µτ
out J
µτ
G , (34)
Pµτvµτ = (I − Pµτout )hµτG + vµτ , (35)
for some vector vµτ .
Proof. Given the policies µˆ and τˆ for ACPS problem, we have
J µˆτˆG = P
µˆτˆJ µˆτˆG ,
J µˆτˆG + h
µˆτˆ
G = g
µˆτˆ + P µˆτˆhµˆτˆG ,
hµˆτˆG + v
µˆτˆ = P µˆτˆvµˆτˆ ,
Due to the connection between the control policy of Problem
3 and generalized ACPS problem, we have
JµτG = P
µˆτˆJµτG = (I − Pµτout )−1Pµτin JµτG .
By rearranging the equation above, we have (I −Pµτout )JµτG =
JµτG − Pµτout JµτG = Pµτin JµτG . Thus JµτG = (Pµτout + Pµτin )JµτG =
PµτJµτG . The expression J
µτ
G + h
µτ
G = g
µτ + PµτhµτG +
Pµτout J
µτ
G can be rewritten using (27) and (29). We have
JµτG + h
µτ
G = (I − Pµτout )−1(gµτ + Pµτin hµτG ).
Manipulating the equation above, we see that (I−Pµτout )(JµτG +
hµτG ) = g
µτ + Pµτin h
µτ
G . Then we can see that
JµτG + h
µτ
G = g
µτ + (Pµτin + P
µτ
out )h
µτ
G + P
µτ
out J
µτ
G
= gµτ + PµτhµτG + P
µτ
out J
µτ
G .
Start from hµˆτˆG + v
µˆτˆ = P µˆτˆvµˆτˆ . We see that hµˆτˆG + v
µˆτˆ =
(I − Pµτout )−1Pµτin vµτ . Therefore we have
(I − Pµτout )hµτG + vµτ = Pµτvµτ ,
which completes our proof.
Lemma 3 indicates that the gain-bias pair can be solved
as solutions to a linear system with 3n unknowns. Thus we
can evaluate any control and adversary policies using Lemma
3, which provides us the potential to implement iterative
algorithm to compute the optimal control policy µ.
To compute the control policy µ, we define two operators
on (JG , hG) in (36) and (37), denoted as T ∗(JG , hG) and
T (JG , hG). Generally speaking, we can view them as map-
pings from (JG , hG) to T ∗(JG , hG) ∈ Rn and Tµ(JG , hG) ∈
Rn, respectively. Note that in (37), the transition probability
is the one induced under a certain control policy µ.
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(T ∗(JG , hG)) (s) = min
µ
max
τ
[ ∑
uC∈UC(s)
∑
uA∈UA(s)
µ(s, uC)τ(s, uA)g(s) +
∑
uC∈UC(s)
∑
uA∈UA(s)
n∑
s′=1
µ(s, uC) (36)
· τ(s, uA)PrG(s, uC , uA, s′)hG(s′) +
∑
uC∈UC(s)
∑
uA∈UA(s)
n∑
s′=l+1
µ(s, uC)τ(s, uA)PrG(s, uC , uA, s′)JG(s′)
]
, ∀s
(Tµ(JG , hG)) (s) = max
τ
[ ∑
uC∈UC(s)
∑
uA∈UA(s)
µ(s, uC)τ(s, uA)g(s) +
∑
uC∈UC(s)
∑
uA∈UA(s)
n∑
s′=1
µ(s, uC)τ(s, uA) (37)
· PrG(s, uC , uA, s′)hG(s′) +
∑
uC∈UC(s)
∑
uA∈UA(s)
n∑
s′=l+1
µ(s, uC)τ(s, uA)PrG(s, uC , uA, s′)JSG(s′)
]
. ∀s
Based on the definitions above, we present the optimality
conditions for Problem 3 using the following theorem.
Theorem 2. The control policy µ with gain-bias pair
(JµτG , h
µτ
G ) that satisfies
JµτG + h
µτ
G = T
∗(JµτG , h
µτ
G ) (38)
is the optimal control policy.
Proof. Consider any arbitrary control policy µˆ and the worst
case adversary policy τˆ . By definition of T ∗(·) in (36), we have
that (38) implies JµτG +h
µτ
G ≤ gµˆτˆ+P µˆτˆhµτG +P µˆτˆout JµτG , where
P µˆτˆ and P µˆτˆout are the transition probability matrix induced by
policies µˆ and τˆ . Then we have
JµτG + h
µτ
G − P µˆτˆout JµτG ≤ gµˆτˆ + P µˆτˆhµτG
= gµˆτˆ + (P µˆτˆin + P
µˆτˆ
out )h
µτ
G .
Thus we observe that (I−P µˆτˆout )(JµτG +hµτG ) ≤ gµˆτˆ +P µˆτˆin hµτG .
Note that (I − P µˆτˆout ) is invertible. Thus the inequality above
is rewritten as JµτG + h
µτ
G ≤ (I − P µˆτˆout )−1(gµˆτˆ + P µˆτˆin hµτG ).
Rewrite the inequality above according to (27) and (29). Then
we have
JµτG + h
µτ
G ≤ gµ˜τ˜ + P µ˜τ˜hµτG ,
where µ˜ and τ˜ are the control and adversary policies in the
associated ACPS problem. Thus, µ˜∗ satisfies (32) and µ is
optimal over all the proper policies.
Optimal control policy for Problem 3. In the following,
we focus on how to obtain an optimal secure control policy.
First, note that the optimal control policy consists of two parts.
The first part, denoted as µreach, maximizes the probability of
satisfying specification φ1, while the second part, denoted as
µcycle, minimizes the violation cost per cycle due to violating
invariant property. Following the procedure described in Algo-
rithm 4, we can obtain the control policy µreach that maximizes
the probability of satisfying specification φ1. Suppose the set
of accepting states E has been reached. Then the control policy
µcycle that optimizes the long term performance of the system
is generated using Algorithm 5. Algorithm 5 first initializes the
control and adversary policies arbitrarily (e.g., if µ0 and τ0 are
set as uniform distributions, then µ0(s, uC) = 1/|UC(s)| and
τ0(s, uA) = 1/|UA(s)| for all s, uC and uA). Then it follows
a policy iteration procedure to update the control and the
Algorithm 5 Algorithm for a control strategy that minimizes
the expected number of invariant constraint violations.
1: procedure MIN VIOLATION(G, C)
2: Input: product SG G, the set GAMECs C associated
with formula φ1
3: Output: Control policy µcycle
4: Initialization: Initialize µ0 and τ0 be proper policies.
5: while T ∗(Jµ
kτk
C , h
µkτk
C ) 6=
T ∗(Jµ
k−1τk−1
C , h
µk−1τk−1
C ) do
6: Policy Evaluation: Given µk and τk, calculate the
gain-bias pair (Jµ
kτk
C , h
µkτk
C ) using Lemma 3.
7: Policy Improvement: Calculate
the control policy µ using µ =
argminµ argmaxτ
{
gµτ + Pµτhµ
kτk
C + P
µτ
out J
µkτk
C
}
.
8: Set µk+1 = µ.
9: Set k = k + 1.
10: end while
11: end procedure
corresponding adversary policies until no more improvement
can be made. Given µreach and µcycle, we can construct the
optimal control policy for Problem 3 as
µ∗ =
{
µreach, if s /∈ E
µcycle, if s ∈ E
. (39)
We finally present the convergence and optimality of Algo-
rithm 5 using the following theorem.
Theorem 3. Algorithm 5 terminates within a finite number
of iterations for any given accepting state set E . Moreover,
the result returned by Algorithm 5 satisfies the optimality
conditions for Problem 3.
Proof. In the following, we first prove Algorithm 5 converges
within a finite number of iterations. Then we prove that
the results returned by Algorithm 5 satisfies the optimality
conditions in Theorem 2. We denote the iteration index as k.
The control policy at kth iteration is denoted as µk. The worst
case adversary policy associated with µk is denoted as τk.
Define a vector δ ∈ Rn as δ = JµkτkG 1+hµ
kτk
G −gµ
k+1τk+1−
Pµ
k+1τk+1hµ
kτk
G − Pµ
k+1τk+1
out J
µkτk
G 1.
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By Lemma 3, we have Jµ
kτk
G 1+h
µkτk
G = g
µτ+Pµτhµ
kτk
G +
Pµτout J
µkτk
G . By the definition of T
∗(·) in (36), the control
policy at iteration k + 1 is computed by optimizing gµτ +
Pµτhµ
kτk
G +P
µτ
out J
µkτk
G . Thus we have that for all s, δ(s) ≥ 0.
Moreover, we can rewrite vector δ as
δ = Jµ
kτk
G 1 + h
µkτk
G − gµ
k+1τk+1 − Pµk+1τk+1hµk+1τk+1G
− Pµk+1τk+1out Jµ
k+1τk+1
G 1 + P
µk+1τk+1hµ
k+1τk+1
G
+ Pµ
k+1τk+1
out J
µk+1τk+1
G 1− Pµ
k+1τk+1hµ
kτk
G
− Pµk+1τk+1out Jµ
kτk
G 1
= Jµ
kτk
G 1 + h
µkτk
G − Jµ
k+1τk+1
G 1− hµ
k+1τk+1
G
− Pµk+1τk+1
(
hµ
kτk
G − hµ
k+1τk+1
G
)
− Pµk+1τk+1out
(
Jµ
kτk
G − Jµ
k+1τk+1
G
)
1,
where the second equality holds by Lemma 3. Thus δ can be
represented as
δ =
(
I − Pµk+1τk+1out
)(
Jµ
kτk
G − Jµ
k+1τk+1
G
)
1
+
(
I − Pµk+1τk+1
)(
hµ
kτk
G − hµ
k+1τk+1
G
)
, (40)
where I is the identity matrix. By multiplying Pµ
k+1τk+1
t
to
both sides of (40) and calculating the summation over t from
0 to T − 1, we have that
T−1∑
t=0
Pµ
k+1τk+1
t
δ =
T−1∑
t=0
Pµ
k+1τk+1
t (
I − Pµk+1τk+1out
)
·
(
Jµ
kτk
G − Jµ
k+1τk+1
G
)
1+
T−1∑
t=0
Pµ
k+1τk+1
t (
I − Pµk+1τk+1
)
·
(
hµ
kτk
G − hµ
k+1τk+1
G
)
. (41)
Divide both sides by T and let T →∞. Then we have
lim
T→∞
T−1∑
t=0
1
T
Pµ
k+1τk+1
t
δ = lim
T→∞
T−1∑
t=0
1
T
(
Pµ
k+1τk+1
t
− Pµk+1τk+1 tPµk+1τk+1out
)(
Jµ
kτk
G − Jµ
k+1τk+1
G
)
1 (42)
since the second term of (41) is eliminated when T →
∞. Since Pµk+1τk+1out is a substochastic matrix, we have
Pµ
k+1τk+1
out 1 ≤ 1. Furthermore, since Pµ
k+1τk+1 is a stochastic
matrix, we see that 1 − Pµk+1τk+1out 1 ≥ 0. Thus we have(
Pµ
k+1τk+1
t − Pµk+1τk+1 tPµk+1τk+1out
)
1 ≥ 0. Given the in-
equality above and δ ≥ 0, we have that JµkτkG −Jµ
k+1τk+1
G ≥ 0
by observing (42), which implies that Jµ
kτk
G ≥ Jµ
k+1τk+1
G .
Consider the scenario where Jµ
kτk
G = J
µk+1τk+1
G . We
further need to show that in this case hµ
kτk
G ≤ hµ
k+1τk+1
G . For
each state that belongs to the recurrent class, the corresponding
entry of
∑T−1
t=0 P
µk+1τk+1
t
is positive. By observing (42), we
have δ(s) = 0 for all s belonging to the recurrent class. Thus
according to (41), we have that hµ
kτk
G (s) = h
µk+1τk+1
G (s) for
all s in the recurrent class.
By observing (41), we have
lim
T→∞
T−1∑
t=0
Pµ
k+1τk+1
t
(hµ
kτk
G − hµ
k+1τk+1
G )
= hµ
kτk
G − hµ
k+1τk+1
G − lim
T→∞
T−1∑
t=0
Pµ
k+1τk+1
t
δ
≤ hµkτkG − hµ
k+1τk+1
G − δ.
Note that the elements corresponding to the transient states
in Pµ
k+1τk+1
t
(hµ
kτk
G − hµ
k+1τk+1
G ) approach zero when t →
∞. Thus we have hµkτkG (s) − hµ
k+1τk+1
G (s) ≥ δ(s) ≥ 0 for
all transient states s. Combining all the above together, we
have that µk = µk+1 when δ = 0, otherwise hµ
kτk
G (s) −
hµ
k+1τk+1
G (s) ≥ 0 holds for some transient state s.
When Algorithm 5 terminates, we have that
T ∗(Jµ
k+1τk+1
G , h
µk+1τk+1
G ) = T
∗(Jµ
kτk
G , h
µkτk
G ). (43)
By using policy iteration algorithm, the gain-bias pair
(Jµ
kτk
G , h
µkτk
G ) is first evaluated using Lemma 3 at each
iteration k. Then using the gain-bias pair obtained in policy
evaluation phase, the T ∗ operator is calculated as shown in
Algorithm 5. Thus according to Lemma 3, we see
µ = argmin
µ
max
τ
{
gµτ + Pµτhµ
kτk
G + P
µτ
out J
µkτk
G
}
. (44)
Note that the right hand side of (44) is equivalent to how T ∗
is calculated in Algorithm 5. Therefore, by combining (43)
and (44), we obtain Jµ
kτk
G + h
µkτk
G = T
∗(Jµ
kτk
G , h
µkτk
G ). By
Theorem 2, we see that µk is the optimal control policy.
VII. CASE STUDY
In this section, we present two case studies to demonstrate
our proposed method. In particular, we focus on the application
of remotely controlled UAV under deception attack. In the
first case study, the UAV is given a specification modeling
reach-avoid requirement. In the second case study, the UAV is
given a specification modeling surveillance and collision free
requirement. Both case studies were run on a Macbook Pro
with 2.6GHz Intel Core i5 CPU and 8GB RAM.
A. Case Study I: Remotely Controlled UAV under Deception
Attack with Reach-Avoid Specification
In this case study, we focus on the application of remotely
controlled UAV, which conducts package delivery service. The
UAV carries multiple packages and is required to deliver the
packages to pre-given locations in particular order (e.g., the
solution of a travelling salesman problem). The UAV navigates
in a discrete bounded grid environment following system
model x(t + 1) = x(t) + (uC(t) + uA(t) + ϑ(t)) ∆t, where
x(t) ∈ R2 is the location of the UAV, uC(t) ∈ U ⊆ R2
is the control signal, uA(t) ∈ A ⊆ R2 is the attack signal,
ϑ(t) ∈ D ⊆ R2 is the stochastic disturbance and ∆t is time
interval. In particular, we let the control set U = [−0.3, 0.3]2,
the attack action signal set A = [−0.2, 0.2]2, the disturbance
set D = [−0.05, 0.05]2. Also, the disturbance ϑ(t) ∼ N (0,Γ),
where Γ = diag(0.152, 0.152).
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Fig. 1: Comparison of the proposed approach and the approach without considering the presence of the adversary. Fig. 1a gives
the trajectories obtained using two approaches. The solid blue line is the trajectory obtained using the proposed approach, while
the dashed red line represents the trajectory obtained using the approach without considering the presence of the adversary.
Fig. 1b and Fig. 1c present the probability of satisfying the LTL specification using the proposed approach and the approach
without considering the adversary when the initial state is set as each of the states lands in the intersections of the grid world,
respectively. The shade of gray level at the intersection states corresponds to the satisfaction probability, with black being
probability 0 and white being probability 1.
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Fig. 2: Comparison of the proposed approach and the approach without considering the presence of the adversary. Fig. 1a gives
the trajectories obtained using two approaches. The solid blue line is the trajectory obtained using the proposed approach, while
the dashed red line represents the trajectory obtained using the approach without considering the presence of the adversary.
Fig. 2b shows the expected invariant constraint violation cost with respect to iteration indices.
State (7, 8) (8, 8) (13, 8) (14, 8) (7, 13) (8, 13) (13, 13) (14, 13)
PrµτG 0.6684 0.6028 0.5915 0.4893 0.8981 0.7126 0.6684 0.6028
Prµ˜τ˜G 0.3619 0.3182 0.2878 0.1701 0.6146 0.5112 0.3619 0.3182
Improvement 84.69% 89.44% 105.52% 187.65% 46.13% 39.40% 84.69% 89.44%
TABLE I: Comparison of probabilities of satisfying specification φ when starting from the states located in intersections using
proposed approach and approach without considering the adversary.
We abstract the system as an SG using Algorithm 1. In
particular, given the location of the UAV, we can map the
location of the UAV to the grid and simulate the grid it
reaches at time t + 1. Each grid in the environment can be
mapped to a state in the SG. In this case study, there exists
400 states in the SG. In the following, we use location and
state interchangeably. The control actions and attack signals
are sets of discrete control inputs. The label of each state is
shown in Fig. 1a. The transition probability can be obtained
using Algorithm 1.
The UAV is required to deliver packages to three locations
‘dest1’, ‘dest2’, and ‘dest3’ in this particular order after
departing from its ‘home’. Then it has to return to ‘home’
and stay there forever. Also during this delivery service, the
UAV should avoid colliding with obstacle areas marked as
black in Fig. 1a to Fig. 1c. The LTL formula is written as φ =
home∧3(dest1∧3(dest2∧3dest3))∧32home∧2¬obstacle.
We compare the control policy obtained using the proposed
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approach with that synthesized without considering the pres-
ence of the adversary. In Fig. 1a, we present the sample trajec-
tories obtained using these approaches. The solid line shows
a sample trajectory obtained by using the proposed approach,
and the dashed line shows the trajectory obtained by using the
control policy synthesized without considering the presence of
adversary. To demonstrate the resilience of the proposed ap-
proach, we let the states located in the intersections be labelled
as ‘home’ and hence are set as the initial states. We compare
the probability of satisfying the specification φ using the
proposed approach and the approach without considering the
adversary in Fig. 1b and Fig. 1c, respectively. We observe that
the control policy synthesized using the proposed approach has
higher probability of satisfying specification φ. The detailed
probability of satisfying specification φ is listed in Table
I. Denote the probability of satisfying specification φ using
the proposed approach and the approach without considering
the adversary as PrµτG and Pr
µ˜τ˜
G , respectively. By using the
proposed approach, the average of the improvements of the
probability of satisfying the given specification starting from
intersection states achieves (PrµτG − Prµ˜τ˜G )/Prµ˜τ˜G = 90.87%.
The computation of transition probability took 890 seconds.
Given the transition probability, the SG and DRA associated
with specification φ are created within 1 and 0.01 second,
respectively. The computation of product SG took 80 seconds.
The product SG has 2000 states and 41700 transitions. It took
45 seconds to compute the control policy.
B. Case Study II: Remotely Controlled UAV under Deception
Attack with Liveness and Invariant Specification
In this case study, we focus on the same UAV model as pre-
sented in Section VII-A. Let the UAV be given an LTL spec-
ification φ = 2(3(dest1∧3(dest2∧3dest3)))∧2¬obstacle
consisting of liveness and invariant constraints. In particular,
the lieveness constraint φ1 = 2(3(dest1∧3(dest2∧3dest3)))
models a surveillance task, i.e., the UAV is required to patrol
three critical regions infinitely often following a particular
order, and the invariant constraint ψ = 2¬obstacle requires
the UAV to avoid collisions with obstacles. Once the critical
regions are visited, a cycle is completed. During each cycle,
the rate of invariant constraint violation need to be minimized.
The cost incurred at each violation is assigned to be 20.
We compare the proposed approach with the approach
without considering the adversary. The sample trajectories
obtained using these approaches are presented in Fig. 2a. In
particular, the solid line shows a sample trajectory obtained
by using the proposed approach, and the dashed line shows
the trajectory obtained by using the control policy synthesized
without considering the presence of adversary. We observe
that the control strategy of synthesized using the approach
without considering the adversary uses less effort comparing
to the proposed approach. However, the proposed approach
is more resilient since it uses more control effort to deviate
from the obstacles to minimize the violation cost. We present
the average invariant constraint violation cost incurred using
the control policy obtained at each iteration in Fig. 2b.
We observe that the proposed approach incurs lower cost
after convergence. In Fig. 2b, the approach that does not
consider the adversary incurs lower cost compared to the
proposed approach during iterations 2 to 6. The reason is
that although the proposed approach guarantees convergence
to Stackelberg equilibrium, it does not guarantee optimality
of the intermediate policies. The average invariant constraint
violation cost using proposed approach is 23.90, while the
average invariant constraint violation cost using the approach
without considering the adversary is 40.52. The improvement
achieved using the proposed approach is 28.67%.
Given the transition probability, the SG and DRA associated
with specification φ are created within 1 and 0.01 second,
respectively. The computation of product SG took 72 seconds.
The product SG has 1600 states and 26688 transitions. It took
36 seconds to compute the control policy.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we investigated two problems on a discrete-
time dynamical system in the presence of an adversary. We
assumed that the adversary can initiate malicious attacks on
the system by observing the control policy of the controller
and choosing an intelligent strategy. First, we studied the
problem of maximizing the probability of satisfying given
LTL specifications. A stochastic Stackelberg game was formu-
lated to compute a stationary control policy. A deterministic
polynomial-time algorithm was proposed to solve the game.
Second, we formulated the problem of minimizing the ex-
pected times of invariant constraint violation while maximiz-
ing the probability of satisfying the liveness specification. We
developed a policy iteration algorithm to compute an optimal
control policy by exploiting connections to the ACPS problem.
The bottleneck of the proposed framework is the computation
complexity of the abstraction procedure. However, this is
beyond the scope of this work. The potential ways to reduce
the computation complexity include exploring the symmetry of
the environment, and applying receding horizon based control
framework. In future work, we will consider non-stationary
control and adversary policies.
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